Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v.
Thomas D. Guy, Aspen Construction : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven B. Wall; Wall and Wall; Attorney for Appellee.
Joseph M. Chambers; Harris, Preston and Chambers; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing v. Guy, No. 20001009 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3002

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING
AND HEATING,

Priority No. 15
*

No. 20001009-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah corporation,

*
*

Trial Court Case:
940300014CN

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from an Order of the
Third Judicial District Court
Summit County, Utah
The Honorable Frank G. Noel, Presiding

Joseph M. Chambers (0612)
HARRIS, PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, UT 84321
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

Steven B. Wall
WALL & WALL
5200 South Highland Drive, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

FILE
APR 1 8 ,- U1
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING
AND HEATING,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

*
*

Priority No. 15

*

No. 20001009 - CA

*

vs.
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah corporation,

*
*
*
*

Trial Court Case:
940300014CN

*

Defendants/Appellants,

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from an Order of the
Third Judicial District Court
Summit County, Utah
The Honorable Frank G. Noel, Presiding

Joseph M. Chambers (0612)
HARRIS, PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, UT 84321
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Steven B. Wall
WALL & WALL
5200 South Highland Drive, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The following parties and attorneys appeared in the proceeding in the District Court:
1.

A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating, Inc., a Utah corporation

Plaintiff/Appellee, is represented by Steven Wall of WALL & WALL, Salt Lake City. Utah.
2.

Aspen Construction, Inc., a Utah corporation and Thomas D. Guy

Defendants/Appellants, are represented by Joseph M. Chambers of HARRIS, PRESTON &
CHAMBERS, Logan, Utah. (940300014 CN - District Court)

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.
B.

Nature of the Case
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below

2
3

C.

Statement of Facts

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT
AFTER RULING THAT WHIPPLE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ON
THE $30,647.20 MECHANICS' LIEN IT HAD FILED AGAINST THE THAYNES
CANYON PROPERTY, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO AWARD THE DEFENDANTS, THE "SUCCESSFUL PARTY" IN
THE LIEN FORECLOSURE ACTION, THEIR REASONABLE ATTORNEY
FEES AS COSTS OF THE ACTION AS REQUIRED UNDER §38-1-18 U.C.A

8

A.
B.

Evidentiary Basis
What Constitutes a Successful Party?
1.
Defendants Did Not Just Barely Prevail
2.
Defendants Did Not Merely Prevail on a "Legal Issue"
C.
Attorney Fees Incurred on Appeal

CONCLUSION

17

ADDENDUMS:
1.
2.
3.
4
5.

8
10
11
13
16

Copy of the original Notice of Claim of Lien for $30,647.20.
Whipple's Trial Exhibit 12 - Summary of Whipple's Claims.
Copy of Minute Entry following trial. (Record 262)
Memorandum Decision dated January 20, 2000. (Record 2022)
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction.
977 P.2d 518, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).

n

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases Cited
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction. 977 P.2d 518,
cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999)

2,3,4,12

American Rural Cellular. Inc. v. Systems Communication Corp.. 939 P.2d 185
(Utah App. 1997)

16

Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1999)
Cottonwood Mall Co.. v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992)
First General Services v. Perkins. 918 P.2d 480,486 (Utah App. 1996)
Foote v. Clark. 962 P. 2d 52 (Utah 1998)

15J6
9
15,16,17
8

J. V. Hatch Const, v. Kampros. 971 P.2d 8 (Utah App. 1998)

16

Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 555-58 (Utah App. 1989)

12

Petty Inv. Co. v. Miller. 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978)

12

Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297,452 P.2d 325 (1969)

12

Rotta v. Hawk. 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988)

12

Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l. Bank. 849 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1993)

16

Salmon v. Davis County. 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996)

16

Soft Solutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young University. 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000)
Stunkel v. Gazebo Landscaping Design Inc.. 660 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1995)
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998)
Willey v. Willev. 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997)

2
17
2
17

Zoll and Branch. P. C. v. Asav. 932 P.2d 592, 593 (Utah 1997)

iii

1

Statutes and Rules Cited
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18
§78-2-2(3)0)
§78-2-2(4)

1,2,3,4,6,8,10,12,13,17,18
1
1

Utah R. App. P. Rules 3 and 4

1

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING
AND HEATING,

*
*

Priority No. 15

*

Plaintiff/Appellee,

*

No. 20001009 - CA

vs.

Trial Court Case:
940300014CN

THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah corporation,

*
*
*
*

Defendants/Appellants.

*
JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(3)0) and Utah R. App. P. Rules 3 and 4. Pursuant to §78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, the Utah
Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE: After ruling that the mechanics' lien claimant was not entitled to a judgment of
foreclosure with respect to its $30,647.20 mechanics' lien, the trial court committed error when it
failed to comply with the statutory mandate contained in §38-1-18 U.C. A. and declined to award the
successful party their reasonable attorneys fees. As the "successful party" in this lien foreclosure
action, the Defendants, (the homeowner and general contractor respectively) submit that as a matter
of law they were entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney fees pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C. A.,
particularly in light of the express instructions of the Court of Appeals in the prior appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The interpretation of a statute poses a question of law which
this court reviews for correctness and without deference to the lower court's conclusions." Zoll and
Branch, P. C. v. Asav. 932 P.2d 592, 593 (Utah 1997). The Appellants believe the foregoing issue
1

primarily challenges the trial court's conclusions of law, which an appellate court would accord no
particular deference, but review for correctness. "[W]hether attorney fees are recoverable in an action
is a question of law, which we review for correctness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315
(Utah 1998); Soft Solutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 1095, (Utah 2000); "Whether
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review for correctness." A.K.
& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, cert, denied, 994P.2d 1271 (Utah
1999).
CITATION TO RECORD WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED: Defendants' Memorandum of
Points and Authority in Support of Defendants' Request for Attorney Fees filed November 2,1999,
Record 1975; Notice of Appeal filed November 17, 2000, Record 2050.

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE
Utah Code §38-1-18:
§ 38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action. Amended by Laws 1961, c. 76; Laws 1995, c. 172, § 4, eff.
May 1, 1995.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from the final judgment (on remand from

the Utah Court of Appeals) of the Third District Court, Summit County, which denied the Plaintiffs
claim for relief of foreclosure of its $30,647.20 mechanics' lien,1 entered a judgment against Whipple
in the amount of $527.00, but declined to award the Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred

1

See Addendum "1" - Whipple's Notice of Claim of Lien filed September 14, 1993.

2

in successfully defending against the lien foreclosure action, which fees the Defendants had requested
pursuant to §38-1-18 Utah Code Annotated.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW:

Following an appeal (first appeal) by the Defendants (homeowner and general contractor), the
Utah Court of Appeals entered an order remanding the matter to the trial court for disposition
consistent with its opinion. A. K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977
P.2d 518, 527 (Utah App. 1999). After remand, the trial court held a telephone conference with the
attorneys and set deadlines to submit memoranda as to the remaining issues identified by the Utah
Court of Appeals for resolution by the trial court. The trial court held a hearing on November 10,
1999, at which time the trial court heard arguments and took evidence (by way of affidavit) as to the
reasonable attorney fees incurred by the parties. On January 20, 2000, the trial court entered its
Memorandum Decision as to the remaining issues - Record 2022.2 The trial court denied Whipple's
claim for relief of foreclosure of its $30,647.20 mechanics' lien, and entered a judgment in favor of the
homeowner and general contractor and against the Plaintiff in the amount of $527.00.
Notwithstanding Whipple's failure to obtain an order of foreclosure of its mechanics' lien, the trial
court declined to award the Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully
defending against the foreclosure, which the Defendants had requested pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C. A.
Sometime in September 2000, Whipple's attorney submitted Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order of Foreclosure as directed by the trial court in the
Memorandum Decision. The trial court signed the amended pleadings which werefiledwith the clerk

2

There are actually two memorandum decisions in the record: one dated January 12,2000 (Record 2015), and
one dated January 20,2000 (Record 2022). Except for the dates they are otherwise identical. Because the January 20,
2000 decision is the only decision which the Defendant's attorney received, this decision is referenced. The other
decision was first discovered around April 11, 2001, after reviewing the record and finalizing this brief.
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of the court on October 18, 2000. On November 17, 2000, the Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal
in relationship to the trial court's failure to award the Defendants their reasonable attorney fees
incurred in successfully defending against the lien foreclosure proceeding in this action.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

For purposes of this appeal the Defendants respectfully

submit the following as being relevant for this appeal3:
1. On March 18, 1999, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order remanding this matter to
the trial court for disposition of the matter consistent with its opinion stating:
T[ 31 The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in any action brought to enforce any
lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action."
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1997). In this case, although the trial court initially
granted Aspen's motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien
claim because of improper licensure, it went on to award Whipple the value of the
work performed on Aspen's property. Based in part on this finding, the trial court
concluded that Whipple was the prevailing party and entitled to an award of attorney
fees. However, this conclusion may be erroneous in light of our determination that
section 58-55-604 precludes Whipple from recovering for its HVAC work. Based
upon our review of the record, it appears the HVAC claim was the single most
important issue in this case and Aspen, having fully prevailed on the HVAC claim in
this appeal, may now be entitled to prevailing party status under section 38-1-18. If
on remand the trial court determines Aspen is the prevailing party under section
38-1-18, then Aspen must be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding
attorney fees incurred in pursuing its claim. We therefore remand this issue to the
trial court for a redetermination of the attorney fees award consistent with this
opinion and the entry of findings necessary to support the revised award.
[Emphasis supplied by the Appellant.] (p. 525) A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing &
Heating v. Aspen Constr.. 977P.2d518, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).

Shortly after the remand, the trial court held a telephone conference with the attorneys and set
deadlines to submit memoranda as to the remaining issues identified by the Court of Appeals for
resolution by the trial court. (Telephone Conference with Judge Noel held September 13, 1999.)

3

A detailed summary of the underlying facts in this case are set forth fully in A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing &
Heating v. Aspen Const., 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999), a copy of which is included as Appendix "5 ."
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2. On November 2,1999, the Defendants submitted their Memorandum of Law and Affidavit
of Attorneys Fees which detailed the dates the work was performed, the hourly rate, the time spent,
and described in detail the nature of the services performed. Additionally, the Defendants' attorney
allocated the fees between: (1) the successful claims for which there may have been entitlement to
fees; (2) the unsuccessful claims for which there would have been a claim for fees had the claims been
successful; and (3) the claims for which there would be no entitlement to attorney fees. (Defendants'
Attorney's Affidavit - Record 1975)
3. The trial court held a hearing on November 10, 1999, in Salt Lake City. The court heard
arguments and took evidence from the Defendants' attorney (by way of affidavit) as to the reasonable
attorney fees incurred by the Defendants. Whipple's attorney argued at the hearing that he could not
allocate the fees, but after the hearing submitted his affidavit supporting his claim for attorney fees.
(Record 2062, Transcript of Hearing, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 10,1999; Letter and Affidavit
of Plaintiff s Attorney filed November 12,1999 - two days following the hearing; see also Defendants'
Objection to the late submission filed November 17, 1999.)
4. On January 20, 2000, the trial court entered its memorandum decision as to the remaining
issues. The trial court denied Whipple's claim for relief of foreclosure of the $30,647.20 mechanics'
lien and entered a judgment against Whipple in the amount of $527.00. (Record 2022) The initial
appeal and subsequent remand involved three (3) separate lien foreclosure matters which were
consolidated for trial.4 The trial court held for Whipple on the other two (2) lien foreclosure matters,
determined the lien amounts ($631.00 and $1,666.00 respectively), found Whipple to be the

4

The three lien foreclosure actions which were consolidated for purposes of trial are referenced hereinafter
for the convenience of the Court as: (1) the Dianne Quinn lien; (2) the Tom Guy Poolhouse lien; and (3) the Thaynes
Canyon property lien.
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"successful party" with respect to those liens, determined reasonable attorney fees related to those lien
foreclosure matters, and entered orders foreclosing the other two parcels of property respectively.
(Record 2022) (Those judgments of foreclosure have subsequently been paid and satisfied by Aspen
Construction.)
5. Notwithstanding Whipple's failure to obtain an order of foreclosure of its $30,647.20
mechanics' lien in this matter (the Thaynes Canyon property), the trial court declined to award the
Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the foreclosure,
which the Defendants had requested pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C. A. (Record 2022)
6. In September 2000, the Plaintiff submitted Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and an Amended Order in accordance with the trial court's January 20, 2000, Memorandum
Decision. These were subsequently signed by the trial court and were later entered by the clerk on
October 18,2000. (Record 2029) On November 17, 2000, the Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal
in relationship to the trial court's failure to award the Defendants their attorney fees incurred in
successfully defending against the lien foreclosure proceeding. No cross appeal has been filed by the
Plaintiff. (Record 2050)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is little dispute that the legal and factual issues surrounding the lien foreclosure of the
Thaynes Canyon property were the primary focus of both parties' efforts expended at trial. The
Plaintiff, a licensed plumbing contractor, but an un-licensed HVAC contractor, asserted that it could
legally claim and foreclose a $30,647.20 mechanics lien for both plumbing and HVAC work. (See

6

Addendum 1 (Notice of Claim of Lien) and Addendum 2 (Whipple's trial exhibit #12 - Summary
of Whipple's lien claims.) Although the HVAC claim was the single most important issue in the
case (as to which the Court of Appeals held the Defendants had fully prevailed) it was not the only
issue on which the Defendants prevailed. In addition to defending against Whipple's HVAC claim,
the Defendants successfully defended against Whipple's claim for labor and equipment in installing
french drains ($3,162.05), relocating a municipal water line ($6,660.80), and backhoe rental
($780.00.) The Defendants also successfully prevailed on their counterclaim that the HVAC System
was defective. The trial court granted the Defendants a $7,000.00 offset for deficiencies it found
in the HVAC system as well as a $2,000.00 offset to finish the plumbing work. All these issues
arose during the trial in addition to the issue the Defendants prevailed upon during the first appeal
concerning Whipple's lack of an HVAC license.5
The trial court erred when it held that these issues were not "inextricably related" to the
overall defense of Whipple's lien claim. When the trial court entered a monetary judgment against
Whipple (effectively denying the $30,647.20 lien claim) the Defendants attained "successful party"
status as a matter of law; the trial court's refusal to grant them their reasonable attorneys fees

5

At trial Whipple vigorously pursued its $30,647.20 lien claim. Whipple's trial exhibit #12 (Addendum 2)
clearly shows that Whipple sought (net of Aspen's $17,000 payments which were properly credited against the
Thaynes Canyon property) approximately $30,441.35 plus the costs of filing the Notice of Claim of Lien. Whipple's
lien claim against the Thaynes Canyon property was composed of the following items and amounts:
Item Claimed - 77 Thaynes Canyon
Laterals (sewer)
Municipal Water Re-location
French Drains
Backhoe
Plumbing
Heating
Gas Piping
Subtotal
Less Payments
Total Claim

7

Amount
$10,000.00
$ 6,660.80
$ 3,162.05
$ 780.00
$13,358.00
$12,265.50
$ 1,015.00
$47,441.35
<$17,000.00>
$30,441.35

related to defeating Whipple's lien claim was error as a matter of law. The trial court's award of
attorney fees to the Plaintiff on the two mechanics' liens that it prevailed on, and denial to the
Defendants on the mechanics' lien claim they prevailed on, is logically and legally inconsistent and
mandates reversal and remand to another trial judge for a fair and impartial determination of the
reasonable attorney fees the Defendants are entitled to, including fees related to this appeal.

ARGUMENT
AFTER RULING THAT WHIPPLE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY
SUM ON THE $30,647.20 MECHANICS' LIEN, THE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO AWARD THE DEFENDANTS,
THE "SUCCESSFUL PARTY" IN THE LIEN FORECLOSURE ACTION, THEIR
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AS COSTS OF THE ACTION AS REQUHIED
UNDER §38-1-18 U.C.A.
Following the remand, the trial court held a hearing and subsequently entered a
Memorandum Decision regarding all three of the lien foreclosure cases which were consolidated for
purposes of trial.6 At the hearing, the Defendants argued that application of \21 andffi[30-34of the
Court of Appeals' opinion required a factual and legal determination by the trial court that the
Defendants were the "successful party" with respect to the litigation involving the Thaynes Canyon
property, and consequently were entitled to their reasonable attorney fees in defending against that
lien foreclosure matter.
A.

Evidentiary Basis.
Prior to the hearing, the Defendants' attorney submitted his affidavit which was prepared

to comply with the requirements articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d
52 (Utah 1998). Citing the Foote v. Clark decision in ^[32, the Utah Court of Appeals stated the
following:
6

See footnote 4.
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The party must differentiate between the fees and time expended for "(1) successful
claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful
claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the
claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement for attorney
fees." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). This
requirement also obligates the trial court to make findings which closely resemble
the requesting party's allocation of fees on each claim. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55.
Finally, the trial court must clearly identify and document the factors it considered
dispositive in calculating the award. See id. Absent such an allocation and
documentation, this court cannot adequately review the trial court's decision. See id.
at 57.
Based upon the foregoing standard, the Defendants' attorney made the following allocations
of attorney fees:
Category 1:

$30,902.89

Category 2:

4,531.00

Category 3:

1.000.00

Total Fees Incurred:

$36.433.89

(See Affidavit of Defendants' counsel paragraphs 5 & 6 filed November 2, 1999 - Record 1975.)
The inclusion of the majority of the fees in Category 1 was due exclusively to the fact that
the defense of Whipple's $30,647.20 mechanics' lien claim (which was itself comprised of several
different components - see Addendum 2) required proof of and counter proofs on the several
different claims: (1) proof by the Defendants as to whether the HVAC system was defective and
therefore added no value to the property; (2) whether Whipple's lack of an HVAC license estopped
him from being able to pursue foreclosure as a matter of law; and (3) whether Aspen owed Whipple
for services it had not contracted or requested regarding the installation of french drains, the
relocation of the municipal water line and payment for the use of a backhoe left by Whipple at the
construction site. The mechanics' lien claimant must prove that he has enhanced the value of the
property; conversely, if the Defendants could prove the HVAC system was deficient, then the lien

9

claimant has not enhanced the property. At trial, the Defendants were successful in convincing the
trial court that at least $7,000.00 of repairs were needed to remedy the negligent HVAC installation
as well as a $2,000 offset for the unfinished plumbing work. (See Record 262) By successfully
prosecuting the appeal on the HVAC issue (which the Court of Appeals observed was the "single
most important issue in the case"), the Defendants defeated the lien claim and the trial court found
that the Defendants were entitled to a monetary judgment of $527.00. However, this Court should
not lose sight of the fact that had the Defendants prevailed only on the HVAC issue, Defendants
would noi be the "successful party " in this case. In order to be successful the Defendants had to
prevail (and they did prevail) on several issues. (See Whipple's lien claims summarized in footnote
4 and Addendum "2."
B.

What Constitutes a "Successful Party"?
§38-1-18 U.C.A., 1953 provides in pertinent part as follows
. . . in any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in the action. (Emphasis supplied by Defendants)
The issue before the trial court was simply whether the Defendants were the "successful party"

in the lien foreclosure action involving the Thaynes Canyon property. Following the hearing, the
trial court found Whipple to be the successful party with respect to the mechanics' lien on the Diane
Quinn property as well as the mechanics' lien on the Tom Guy Pool house property, and awarded
fees to the Plaintiff in connection with those two lien foreclosure matters as to which no appeal or
cross appeal has been taken. Regarding the lien filed against the Thaynes Canyon property the trial
court determined the Defendants to be the successful party and found they were entitled to a
monetary judgment against Whipple in the amount of $527.00 (effectively denying the Plaintiffs
$30,647,20 lien foreclosure claim). The Defendants respectfully submit that the denial of the right
10

to foreclose the mechanics' lien resulted, as a matter of law, in the Defendants being the "successful
party" as to the foreclosure action filed against the Thaynes Canyon property. Notwithstanding,
the trial court declined to award the Defendants any attorney fees setting forth in the Memorandum
Decision two reasons: 1) The Defendants had just barely prevailed in the lien foreclosure action
involving the Thaynes Canyon property; and 2) The Defendants "prevailed on an essentially legal
issue."
1.

"The Defendants Did Not Just Barely Prevail" The first reason articulated by the trial

court was that the Defendants had just barely prevailed. The trial court in explaining its reasoning
stated the following:
It is important to the Court to note however that defendant [sic] is such only by
the amount of $527.00. The Court feels where Plaintiff was claiming roughly
$13,000.00 on the Thayne's Canyon property (allowing for the $17,000.00
already paid), and where Defendant was claiming $25,000.00 in damages for the
negligence of the plaintiff, and further where the net recovery is only $527.00, the
Court is of the opinion that this is essentially a "draw" and no attorney's fees
should be awarded. The Appellate Courts in our state have acknowledged that the
"net recovery rule" is essentially a starting point and need not be applied strictly
under circumstances.
The trial court's reference to only the $ 13,000.00 plumbing claim (as if the plumbing work was
the only claim Whipple was pursuing against the Thaynes Canyon property) is not only factually
incorrect7 but it misapplies the legal standard by which the Utah courts determine which party in
a lien foreclosure action is the "successful party." It is understandable that given the fact that this
case has been in litigation for over six years, the trial court may have been confused when it
referenced only the $13,000.00 plumbing claim, but this amount was only part of the total amount

7

Whipple's Notice of Claim of Lien contained a demand for $30,647.20 plus costs of filing. The lien was
comprised of the following items and amounts: Sewer laterals $ 10,000; Municipal Water Relocation $ 6,660.80; French
Drains $ 3,162.05; Backhoe Rental $780.00; Plumbing $13,358.00; Heating $12,265.50; Gas Piping $ 1,015.00;
Subtotal $47,441.35 less payments $17,000.00; Total Claim $30,441.35. See Addendums "1" and " 2."
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Whipple was seeking on its mechanics' lien. See Addendums 1 (Notice of Claim of Lien); 2
(Whipple's trial exhibit 12) and 3 (trial court's Minute Entry following trial, Record 262.) In
essence, the trial court holds that defeating a mechanics' lien claim by only a small amount is not
enough to allow a Defendant to claim successful party status. This is error. The Defendants fully
prevailed against Whipple's assertion of a $30,647.20 mechanics' lien. It is respectfully submitted
that the trial court incorrectly applied the law. Had the Defendants failed to recover any sum but
still prevented Whipple from obtaining an order allowing foreclosure of its lien, they would,
pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C.A., be the

f<

successful party and ergo, entitled to their reasonable

attorneys 'fees.
An examination of the case law regarding what constitutes a "successful party" reveals the
application of a simple two-part test: First, the courts look to the complaint in the underlying action.
If the complaint (or a counterclaim arising out of the underlying action) involves the enforcement
of a mechanics' lien, then reasonable attorneys' fees shall be awarded to the party who was
successful. Second, "success" is determined solely by whether or not the party asserting the right
to enforce the lien was successful. You either are or are not successful in obtaining lien foreclosure.
The concept is one that is mutually exclusive. Petty Inv. Co. v. Miller, 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978);
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969); Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713
(Utah App. 1988).8

8

In fairness to the trial court another point of confusion may have been caused by dicta included in the Court
of Appeals prior decision. See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const.. 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999),
a copy of which is included as Appendix "5 ." In footnote 1, the Court of Appeals states: "On remand, the trial court may
find helpful the guidance offered on this issue by Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551,555-58 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989)." The reference to Mountain States is misleading because Mountain States involved a contracts clause
allowing recovery of attorney fees to the prevailing party, not the application of Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. and while the
Mountain States case may be helpful, in light of the clear authority defining what constitutes a "successful party"
Mountain States could not be dispositive of the issue in this or any other lien foreclosure case.
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Application of the correct legal standard in this case clearly mandates a conclusion, as a matter
of law, that the Defendants were the "successful party" as to the $30,647.20 lien foreclosure action
involving the Thaynes Canyon property.
2.

The Defendants Did Not Merely Prevail on a "Legal Issue."

The trial court went on to explain an additional reason as to why it was denying any attorney
fees:
Moreover, the Court thinks there is an additional reason to award no fees. The
only reason that the defendant received a net recovery, is because it prevailed on
an essentially legal issue, that is that the plaintiffs failure to obtain a contractors
license prevented him from collecting on an equitable basis for the installation of
the HVAC. This issue was clearly distinct and separate from the defendants
negligence claim. The Court does not feel that they are "inextricably tied
together" as urged by the defendant. Had the defendant not prevailed on this legal
issue concerning the plaintiffs Licensure, then plaintiff would have obtained a
net recovery of approximately $8,646.00. The Court therefore is of the opinion
that the defendant [sic] should have allocated attorney fees to the mechanics lien
claim of plaintiff and the time expended litigating the Licensure issues but has
failed to do so.
Without attempting to demean the trial court's reasoning, it appears to the Defendants that the
trial court's reasoning does not give any effect to the specific instructions of the Court of Appeals
and discounts the Defendants' status as a successful party because they merely prevailed on a "legal
issue" (evidently as opposed to an "equitable" or "moral" issue.) The trial court's observation that
"had the defendant [sic] not prevailed on this legal issue. . ." Whipple would have recovered
$8,646.00, while mathematically correct, misapplies the legal standard enacted by the legislature.
On its face §38-1-18 U.C.A. does not distinguish between the methodology one utilizes to be the
successful party, instead the legal determination that attorney fees shall be awarded is based soley
on whether one is or is not successful in relationship with their lien foreclosure claim. The trial
court's analysis leads it to the incorrect result because it fails to fully analyze the entirety of the
$30,647.20 lien claim made by Whipple. The trial court focuses instead on just the $13,000.00
13

plumbing claim as opposed to the $30,647.20 in claims it asserted in the Notice of Lien Claim
asserted against the Thaynes Canyon property.
Conversely, the trial court could have observed that had the Defendants not been successful in
proving their counterclaims (the $7000.00 offset for the deficiencies in the HVAC system and
$2,000.00 offset to finish the plumbing contract, which sums were found by the trial court to be
proper offsets - Record 262) then the Plaintiff would have recovered $8,473.00.9 Both suppositions
are of little relevance, however, because they only analyze a portion of Whipple's claims comprising
its $30,647.20 lien. As the above statements prove, reliance upon only a partial analysis of
Whipple's lien claims and the defenses to those claims creates a logical fallacy which in turn leads
one to arrive at the incorrect conclusion. The Defendants prevailed not simply because they were
successful in one aspect of their defense, as the trial court implies, but because they were successful
on several fronts. A review of the trial court's decision after the trial (Record 262) discloses that
with respect to the Thaynes Canyon property the Defendants were successful on the following
issues:

$6,660.80 - Relocation of the Park City water line for which Whipple sought
and was denied recovery of $6,660.80. Compare Plaintiffs Exhibit 12 with
trial court's decision. (Record 262)
$3,162.05 - French drains. Whipple sought and was denied recovery of
$3,162.05 for installation of french drains. Compare Plaintiffs Exhibit 12
with trial court's decision. (Record 262)
$680.00- Backhoe rental. Whipple sought recovery of $780.00. Whipple
was only granted relief for $100.00. Compare Plaintiffs Exhibit 12 with
trial court's decision. (Record 262)

9

$8,646.00 less. $9,173.00 (the HVAC amount the Plaintiff was not allowed to recover for lack of an HVAC
license) plus $7,000.00 and $2,000.00 (the offsets found by the trial court on the Defendants' counterclaim).
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$2,000.00 - Offset for finish work related to plumbing contract Whipple
sought $13,358.00, but recovered $11,358.00. (Record 262)
$7,000.00 - Offset for deficiencies in the HVAC system. Whipple
contended there were no offsets due because there were no deficiencies. The
trial court granted the Defendants an offset of $7,000.00 due to the
deficiencies found by the trial court in the HVAC system. (Record 262)
$12,265.00 - HVAC contract. Whipple sought and was denied recovery of
$12,265.50 for the HVAC system. Compare Plaintiffs Exhibit 12 and trial
court's original decision (Record 262) with result required by application of
the Court of Appeals' decision on the first appeal.
In this context, one can see the fallacy of the trial court's logic. As a matter of law, the
Defendants were the "successful party" in the litigation surrounding the Thaynes Canyon property,
and they are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. The issues surrounding the lien foreclosure
action involving the Thaynes Canyon property were " inextricably tied together."
This legal principal was discussed in First General Services v. Perkins. 918 P.2d 480 (Utah
App. 1996) and reaffirmed in Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 978 P.2d 470, (Utah App. 1999).
In Brown, the Utah Court of Appeals stated the following:
1f 19 We have awarded fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees may
not have been incurred on strictly compensable issues, because proof of the
compensable and non-compensable claims overlapped. For example, in First
General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct.App.1996), a subcontractor
sought to foreclose a mechanics' lien against a homeowner, and the homeowner
counterclaimed alleging negligent workmanship. See id. at 483. The subcontractor
prevailed and sought recovery of its fees incurred in both the foreclosure of its lien
and defense to the homeowner's counterclaim. See id. The trial court awarded fees
on the foreclosure claim, but refused to award fees under the mechanics' lien statute
for defense against the homeowner's counterclaim. See id.
f 20 On appeal, we reversed, holding that the subcontractor was entitled to fees both
in pursuing its affirmative claims and defending against the counterclaim because the
two were inextricably tied together. See id. at 486. In so holding, we recognized that
where the proof of a compensable claim and otherwise non-compensable claim are
closely related and require proof of the same facts, a successful party is entitled to
recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related facts. See id.
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In Tf 22 of the Brown v. Richards case, the Court of Appeals held that "Richards's defense under
the Asset Sale Agreement (i.e., Richards's defense that Brown failed to substantially perform) had
a common factual basis with his breach of warranty and his negligent and fraudulent
misrepresentation claims." The Court of Appeals further stated that: "[W]here Richards's attorneys'
efforts went to prove facts common to both recoverable contract and non-recoverable fraud claims,
the fees were recoverable."
Like the First General Services case, the fees incurred by the Defendants were incurred by the
homeowner and general contractor in pursuing its affirmative claims and defending against the lien
foreclosure claim; and like the situation in First General Services, the "successful party" should not
be denied the right to recover their reasonable attorney fees because the two were inextricably tied
together. The Appellant would respectfully request that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court
as it did in First General Services for essentially the same reasons set forth in that opinion.
C. Attorney Fees Incurred on Appeal:
The Defendants argued to the trial court that Utah case law required the trial court to include
the attorneys' fees Aspen had incurred on appeal since "An appeal from a suit brought to enforce
a [mechanics'] lien qualifies as part of'an action' for the purpose of section 38-1-18." J. V. Hatch
Const., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 15 (Utah App. 1998) citing Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l
Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah App. 1993). Note: Richards, supra was cited with approval in
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895 (Utah 1996).10

10

See also footnote 7 at page 196 American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Comm. Corp., 939 P.2d 185
(Utah App. 1997) which states:
FN7. Although, as Cellcom suggests, there may not technically have been any prevailing or
successful party in the prior appeal, in determining who is entitled to attorney fees under section 38-1 18, we look to which party was ultimately successful. See Stunkel v. Gazebo Landscaping Design,
Inc., 660 So.2d 623, 627 (Fla.1995). This court did not decide the merits of any claims in the prior
appeal, and thus it could not be determined who was the successful party for purposes of the
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CONCLUSION
The Defendants respectfully submit that the trial court's decision which denied them an award
of their reasonable attorneys' fees was clear error. Defendants were the "successful party" on the
mechanics' lien claim made by Whipple against the Thaynes Canyon property, and they are entitled
to be awarded their reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection therewith. §38-1-18 U.C. A. The
case should be remanded to the District Court with orders to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to
what fees were incurred below and on this appeal with respect to all aspects of the Thaynes Canyon
property. Given that this is Judge Noel's second ruling which the Defendants have had to appeal,
the Defendants respectfully request the matter be remanded to another judge.
The appellate courts of this state are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring legal accuracy
and uniformity of the laws of this state. Willev v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997)
The trial court's denial of attorney fees was error. It compounded this error when it ignored the
multiple claims that the Defendants had prevailed on and focused solely on the "legal issue" on
which it was reversed (and directed by the Court of Appeals that the Defendants had prevailed on).
It compounded its error when it ruled that the issues involved in defending the Plaintiffs lien claim
and the defenses and offsets to the $30, 647.20 lien claim were not inextricably tied to each other.
The trial court's reasons for denying the Defendants' request for their reasonable attorney fees,

mechanics' lien statute until the trial court made its ruling on remand and until this appeal was
resolved.
Moreover, Syscom was forced to defend in the prior appeal to "enforce" its liens, and thus Syscom
is entitled to its attorney fees incurred in defending its lien claims on appeal. Cf. First Gen. Servs.
v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480,486 (Utah.Ct. App. 1996) (holding "the successful defense of counterclaims
which would otherwise defeat the principal lien claim, in whole or in part, must necessarily be
considered for the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the mechanics' lien statute").
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because they merely prevailed on a "legal issue," or because they only prevailed by $527.00 failed
to address or apply the correct legal standard. Throughout the trial and on appeal, the Defendants
constantly challenged the Plaintiffs ability to assert a lien against the Thaynes Canyon property and
did so for multiple reasons. Whipple did not prevail; nonetheless, Whipple caused the Defendants
to incur substantial fees for which a remedy under Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. is mandated. When
Whipple failed to obtain an Order of Foreclosure on its $30,647.20 lien claim, it subjected itself to
the foregoing legislative provision which the trial court was obligated to follow.
It is immaterial by what amount the Defendants prevailed. The core inquiry is simply on
whether Whipple was successful in pursuing its lien claim. Whipple was not successful.
Conversely, the Defendants were successful in preventing the foreclosure of Whipple's $30,647.20
lien. As a consequence of Whipple's failure to obtain an order allowing foreclosure of the claimed
lien, the Defendants, as the successful party, are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. §38-1-18
U.C.A. The trial court has effectively disregarded not only the prior decision of the Court of
Appeals in this case (and the Court of Appeal's express instructions to award the Defendants their
reasonable attorney fees, if on remand the trial court determined that Whipple was not entitled to
recover a sum on its lien foreclosure claim), but has also disregarded the legislative mandate of §381-18 U.C.A.
The Court of Appeals should reverse and remand the case with instructions to award the
Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending the Thaynes Canyon mechanics' lien
claim at trial as well as for all appeals.
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Respectfully submitted t h i s / / day of April, 2001.
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A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING & HTG.
#47 SOUTH 1000 WEST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84104
(801) 359-7141

BK0U751 PSGVSW-GGA

ALAN SPRIGGS, SUMMT COUNTY RECORDER
1??3 SEP H 11:30 AH FEE tlG.QO BY I
REQUESTS INTERtlQUHTAIN LIEN SERVICES

NOTICE OF CLAIM OF LIEN
"Mechanic's Lien"
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES, the undersigned acting as the duly authorized agent of A.K.& R. WHIPPLE
PLUMBING AND HEATING, "lien claimant". Said agent hereby gives
notice of the intention of said claimant to hold and claim a
mechanic's lien and right of claim against bond, by virtue and in
accordance with the provisions of Sections 38-1-3 et. seq., and
14-1-13 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. That said
lien is against the property and improvements thereon owned or
reputed to be owned by THOMAS D. GUY. Said property is located at
77 Thaynes Canyon Drive, Park City, Summit County, Utah.
Parcel #TH8-l

Legal Description:

All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION #8, according to the
official plat thereof as filed in the office of the Summit County
Recorder, Coalville City, Utah.
The lien claimant was employed by and did provide labor and/or
materials (H.V.A.C.) at the request of ASPEN CONSTRUCTION for the
benefit and improvement of said real property. That first labor or
materials were provided on April 27, 1993 and the last said labor
and/or materials were provided on August 1, 1993. That there is
due and owing to said claimant the sum of Thirty Thousand Six
Hundred Forty-seven dollars and Twenty cents ($30,647.20), together
with interest, costs of $100.00 and attorney fees, if applicable;
all for which the lien claimant holds and claims this lien.
INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES,
Agent for the liejyclaimant.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

On September 9, 1993, personally appeared before me Anthony L.
Scarborough, doing business as INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES, the
Company that executed the above and foregoing instrument as agent
for the lien claimant, and that said instrument was signed in
behalf of said Company and that said Anthony L. Scarborough
acknowledged to me that said Company executed the same.
IN WITNESS HEREOF, I have herein set my hand and affixed my seal.
My Commission Expires:
August 9, 1997

ublic," residing in
e City, Utah.

NOTARY PUBLIC
KELLY CASSELL
taoocMft tat torn
_

My Comiri«lonfoptrfuAug.», 199;
KTATfcOnjTAH
I

INTERMOURfXnrZJENSZKriCES,
Ordar- Mnoo-r

P.O.Box

6065,

S.L.C..UT.

RAiso-tnxc

P.O. BOX 526065
Salt Lake City, UT
84152-6065
(801) 486-6672 - Fax 466-2155
September 17, 1993
CERTIFIED

NO.

P 301 439 460

Thomas D. Guy
P.O. Box 680728
Park City, UT 84060
Re:

Lien Against: 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive, Park City, UT
Lien Claimant: A.K.&R- Whipple Plumbing, Salt Lake City, UT
Contracting Party: Aspen Construction, Salt Lake City, UT

Gentlemen/Ladies:
Please be advised, that the attached Mechanic!s Lien has been filed
at the request of the aforesaid MLien Claimant".
The Lien is
intended to secure for the payment of work, equipment or materials
provided for the improvement of your property and establishes legal
rights granted to a contractor or supplier, pursuant to Utah State
Statutes.
This Mechanic's Lien will be released from the County Records upon
payment of all monies due to the claimant. If the obligation is
not paid, they reserve the right to take further action to enforce
their right of lien or claim against bond.
However, it is the claimants preference that litigation be avoided.
We believe that all parties would be best served if you would
prevail upon the contracting party to promptly satisfy this
account. Alternatively, you may wish to pay the claimant directly.
Your acknowledgement and future correspondence should be made
directly to the claimant. Please contact Kent Whipple of A.K.&R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating at (801) 359-7141, as all matters
regarding this debt are handled by them. Thank you.

ALS/kc
enclosure
cc:

A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating
Aspen Construction
File

Tab 2

JOB ORDER
JOB DESCRIPTION

AMOUNTS

Laterals
Thomas Guy
Poolhouse
Diane Quinn Sump Pump
Municipal
Water
Re-location
French Drains
77
Thaynes
Backhoe 77 Thaynes Canyon Dr.
Pool House
Miscellaneous
Diane Quinn Gas Line
77 Thaynes House
Plumbing
77 Thaynes House
Heating
77 Thaynes House Gas
Piping

1)

2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
U)
TOTAL

1)
2)
3)

$10,200.00
$
1,665.92
$
1,100.00
$
6,660.80
$
3,162.05
$
780.00
$
65.00
$
631.00
$13,358.00
$12,265.50
$
1.015.00
$50,968.27

LEINS

AMOUNTS

77 Thaynes Canyon
Drive
Diane Quinn
Residence
Thomas Guy Pool
House

$30,647.20
$
631.00
$
1.695.92

TOTAL LIENS

$32,974.12

TOTAL JOBS
LESS PAYMENTS

$50,968.27

PRINCIPLE BALANCE DUE

$
$
$

7,000.00
7,000.00
3.000.00
$33,968.27

\

EXHIBIT

Tab 3

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
A K & R WHIPPLE PLUMBING AND H
PLAINTIFF

VS
GUY, THOMAS D
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION

CASE NUMBER 940300014 CN
DATE 11/30/95
X
v
HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL
COURT REPORTER WALTON, HAL
COURT CLERK JDO

DEFENDANT

TYPE OF HEARING:
NON JURY TRIAL
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. WALL, STEVEN B
D. ATTY. CHAMBERS, JOSEPH

COURT'S RULING:
MINUTE ENTRY
Whipple v. Aspen Construction

As a preliminary matter the court has reviewed Judge Brian's order carefully and is of
the opinion that he intended that Whipple be compensated, on an equitable basis, for the work
done and benefit conferred on the premises, with adjustments for Aspen's costs to finish the
work and to correct any work that needed correcting. The matter has been prepared for trial
and tried to the court with mat understanding.
At closing argument counsel for Aspen argued that Whipple had not met the threshold
requirement of establishing mechanics liens. However it is the courts recollection that there
was oral evidence that liens had been filed, to which there was no objection, and in addition
the case was tried over a four and one-half day period without any objections to any of the
evidence of Whipple's claimed damages on the basis of no mechanic's liens. The court is
going to allow the claims of Whipple to stand.

Turning to the merits of the claims of the parties, the court finds and rules as; follows:
• That the work performed by Whipple installing laterals from the curb to the house
was not included in the written contracts between the parties for the plumbing work and
awards Whipple $3,200 for that work.
• That Whipple is owed $1,666 for work performed on the Tom Guy pool house.
• That on the issue of the relocation of the Park City irrigation line the testimony of
Kevin Monson is the more credible and accordingly awards Whipple nothing for that work.
• That Aspen's testimony as to the french drain the more credible and awards Whipple
nothing for that claim.
• The court awards Whipple $100 for use of the backhoe.
• The court awards Whipple $631 for the Quinn gas line.
• That Whipple is entitled to $13,000 on its plumbing contract plus $1,158 for extras.
• That Aspen is entitled to a $2000 offset on the plumbing contract for costs; to finish.
• That Whipple, in equity is entitled to $9,173 on its heating contract with Aspen.
($12,265 less $3,092 for Aspen's costs to finish.)
• The court is of the opinion that Aspen has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that there are deficiencies in the heating system. (Leakage and poor air flow to one
room as well as no ducts to a portion of the basement in the area of the wet bar.) Aspen has
failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence, however, that it will be necessary to
completely remove the existing system and install a new system. Aspen has also failed to
show that the 3 furnaces currently installed are inadequate or that the ducting into and out of
said furnaces is improperly sized. Mr. Neely's testimony on this issue was vague at best.
The ducting at the furnaces meets Uniform Mechanical Code requirements. It has not been
shown to the satisfaction of the court that any specifications or recommendations of the
manufacturer have not been met The evidence of a higher industry standard was vague and
not convincing to the court
The court is further of the opinion that many of the problems may be addressed with
further adjustments and fine tuning of the system such as complete installation of thermostats
as designed by Whipple, connecting and operating of zone dampers etc. However, some work
will need to be done to correct the deficiencies mentioned by the court and for that die court
awards Aspen $7,000.
• That Whipple is entitled to $1,015 for gas line installation.
• That Whipple has already been paid $17,000.
The court, therefore calculates the amount due and owing Whipple to be $3,943.
The court is of the opinion that neither party has clearly prevailed and therefore will
award no attorney's fees.
Counsel for Aspen is to prepare more detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law and
a judgement consistent with this ruling and submit them in the proper manner for the courtj^nmu

si ature
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Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on the
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day of
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I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
STEVEN B WALL
Atty for Plaintiff
SUITE 800
BOSTON BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

JOSEPH CHAMBERS
Atty for Defendant
31 FEDERAL AVENUE
LOGAN UT 84321
District Court Clerk

By: C W J). (QlHpA
1/ U Deputy Clerk
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Third District Court
Deputy Clerk, 8umrrm c ^
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

SUwmtT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

A K 16 R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING &
HEATING
Plaintiff,

i is:

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO.940300014CN
APPEALS NO: 970580-CA

:

THOMAS D

GUY 6 ASPEN CONSTRUCTION

Defendant' 'i

:

"T'hjs mutter is before the Court on, remand from the Utah
Court of Appeals with instructions to determine the prevailing
pJii t""!i in

.

, in light of their ruling, and to determine an

allocation •* attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
Thru Cuni» !" linn t eu,3C iVOLI liilufa

nf f niav i t n

has heard oral

argument, and having taken the matter under advisement now rules
as follows:
The Court first observes that the attorney1 s fees in this
case on both sides seems excessively high.

Plainti f f i ID i f i ally

claimed approximately $30,000.00 in contractual damages, but has
admitted throughout that defendant would be entitled to a
$3 3 000 00 credit for amounts paid

-*34t
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant on the other hand claims roughly

$25,000.00 in damages in based on plaintiff's negligence.

If the

claims for all three properties are considered together, then
after the trial courts findings and the Court of Appeals ruling
there would be a net recovery to plaintiff of approximately
$1,770.00.

Each attorney has billed in excess of $30,000.00 in

attorneys fees.

While the Court realises that the issues were

rather varied and complex in this matter, the Court does not feel
that the case was so oomplex as to justify the awarding of
attorney's fees in that amount to either party.
Both parties have submitted affidavits which allocate
attorney's fees to the three different mechanics liens that are
the subject matter of the lawsuit.

That is the Guy pool house

property, the Diane Quinn property, and the Thayne's canyon
property.

Plaintiff, howeverf urges the Court to consider all of

the properties together rather than individually, in which case
the plaintiff would have a net recovery in this matter of
$1i770.00.

Defendant asks the Court to separate the claims and

treat them individually, in which case defendant claims a net
recovery on the Thayne's canyon property and concedes a net
recovery in favor of plaintiff on the Guy pool house and Quinn
properties, but argues as to those properties that the claims
were undisputed.

It is clear that the primary dispute in this

4-34-rr
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case arose from the Thayne's canyon property

However, the Court

points out that while the defendant says the Guy pool house .11 id
Quinn property claims were not disputed, neither did the
defendant pay those claims prior to trial, and indeed when
tttempted to introduce supplemental evidence regarding
the filinc

1-

: the mailing of the notice of the lien
1 ex t:ii es , the defendant vigorously

opposed the introduction of that supplemental evidence.
I inn ft mi i \

rivtiiiiil

iiiiiiiiliijiii

111 II, I l" hm , i i c i i n i B iniicnei'j

I lit! C o u r t

elected to t.real. the three properties individually,

has

The Court

does so for the reas c 1 " 1, f J 111,1 n ii!l: ie, 1: ,. a 3! 31 i 11 11 a, i < I a :t : 1, cioi'11
pool house and Quinn properties were indeed a minor part of

the Guy
•

case, and they should not be relied upon \a support, HI I • 11.11 in r 1 11
significant amount of attorneys fees which were largely incurred
on a separate matter, i.e., the Thayne'a canyon prope -\
which the plaintiff di d not prevail.
Plaintiff allocates $11,250.00 in attorneys fees to the pool
limine pioperty and a like amount to the Quinn property.
Plaintiff clearly prevailed on those claims
other Land

Defendant on the

iilJm a1 e& only %] /HI <'H of. 1 \ 1 attorneys fees to the

Quinn property, and $2,250.00
Court has M'^I I^WM' •l»«» «i '" *J

the pool house property.
.

The

the

complexity of t:he 1 001100 involving in hhn*e claims, and finds

<*#&•
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that a reasonable amount of attorneys fees for the prosecution of
those claima would be $2,000.00 ao to each claim for a total of
$4,000.00 on those claims in favor of plaintiff.
The Court now turns to the Thayne's canyon property. As to
the contract claims only, the Court at trial awarded plaintiff
$32,646.00 which included the following;
1.

2.

Water and aewer
laterals from curb to house

$3,200.00

Plumbing($14,158.00
less $2,000 for offsets)

$12,158.00

3.

Gas line

4.

Baokhoe

5.

Water and sewer
laterals from the street to the curb
HVAC $12,265.00 contract price less

$7,000.00

$3,092.00 to finish

$9,173.00

6.

$1,015.00
$100.00

TOTAL:

$32,646.00

AMOUNT PAID BY DEFENDANTS:
Offset for damages based on deficient
work

- $17,000.00

- $7,000.00
TOTAL:

$8,646.00

Less contract price per Court of Appeals
GRAND TOTAL:

- $9,173.00
($

527.00)

Under a strict application of "Net Recovery Rule" defendant
would be the prevailing party on the Thayne's canyon property.
It is important to the Court to note however that defendant is
such only by the amount of $527.00.

The Court feels where

J

^^r
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I i « i mi ii
n «i| i irmiqlj i v Vi i I'Hhi 0^ on the Thayne' s canyon,

(allowing for the $17,00C 00 already paid), and where

defendant waa c

damages for the negligence

of the plaintiff, and further where the net recovery is only
$527.00, the Court is of tlif nplnt'ii " !•»" linn . I'I nnsentiaJly a
"draw" and no attorney's fees should be awarded.

The Appellate

Courts xn our state have acknowledged tha t the "net r ei i:::ou er y
rule" is essentially a starting point and need not be applied
strictly under all circumstances.
Moreover, the Court thinks there ' s an additional reason to
award no l e M
I fin, I ivei v"

The only reason that the defendant received J HI
''ni i necause it prevailed on an essentially legal issue,

that is that the plaintiffs failure to obtain a contractors
ff

rom collecting on an equitable basis for

the installation
and separate

the HVAC.

This issue was clearly distinct
negligence claim

The Court

does not feel that they are ^inextricably tied together" as urged
by the defendant.

Haul l he defendant

mil (n «vn i I ed on this 1 eg-

issue concerning the plaintiff's Licensure, then plaintiff would
have obtained a net recovery of nppt OK tma' « I v ''" llhl'*1" n 0 .

The

Court therefore is of the opinion that the defendant should have
allocated attorney fees to the mechanics .lien claim of plaintiff
and

*>fc-imeexpended litigating the Licensure issues but has
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failed to do so.
Accordingly, the Court awards no attornays fees on the
Thayne's oanyon property/ and a total of $4,000.00 in favor or
plaintiff on the Thomas Guy pool house and Diana Quinn
properties.
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate Order.

Dated this (^(p

Dav of JANUARY, 2000:

4-M7
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30k842(l) In General.
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's interpretation
of a statute for correctness, without deference to the
trial court's conclusions.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING AND
HEATING, Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-appellant,
v.
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION, Thomas D. Guy, Claire
B. Guy, and Diane
M. Quinn, Defendants, Appellant, and Crossappellees.
No. 971580-CA.
March 18, 1999.
Rehearing Denied April 8, 1999.
Subcontractor brought actions against general
contractor to foreclose mechanics' liens on three
properties on which it had provided heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and
plumbing work. Consolidating actions, the Third
District Court, Coalville Department, Pat B. Brian
and Frank G. Noel, JJ., entered judgment in favor of
subcontractor, including an award of attorney fees.
General contractor appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Wilkins, P.J., held that: (1) subcontractor could not
recover for HVAC work because it was not licensed
to perform such work; (2) granting of subcontractor's
motion to reopen action to take additional evidence
was not abuse of discretion; (3) general contractor did
not adequately marshal evidence in support of
challenged factual findings, precluding consideration
of those findings on appeal; (4) remand was required
to determine whether general contractor was
prevailing party and thus entided to attorney fees; (5)
denial of general contractors motion to dismiss action
based on subcontractor's noncompliance with
scheduling order was not abuse of discretion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error @^>842(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
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[2] Appeal and Error ®^977(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k976 New Trial or Rehearing
30k977 In General
30k977(l) In General.
[See headnote text below]
[2] Appeal and Error @=*982(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k982 Vacating Judgment or Order
30k982(l) In General.
[See headnote text below]
[2] New Trial <®=»6
275 ~ 2751 Nature and Scope of Remedy
275k6 Discretion of Court.
Consideration of a motion to grant a new trial or
open a judgment for additional evidence is a matter
left to the discretion of the trial judge, and that
decision will be reversed only if the judge has abused
that discretion by acting unreasonably.
Rules
Civ.Proc.,Rule59.
[3] Appeal and Error <@=*842(2)
30
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
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30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
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claim to original U.S. Govt, works

Verdicts, and

977 P.2d 518, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Const., (Utah App. 1999)

Page 2

30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30kl008 Conclusiveness in General
30kl008.1 In General
30kl008.1(5) Clearly Erroneous Findings.
Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's findings
of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions for
correctness.

work could not recover for such work in actions
against general contractor to foreclose on mechanics'
liens; in addition to general statutory bar arising from
lack of licensure, none of the common-law exceptions
applied so as to permit recovery under principles of
equity. U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 et seq., 58-55-604.

[4] Appeal and Error <®^842(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) In General.

[7] Appeal and Error <@^854(1)
30 -—
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision of
Lower Court
30k854 Reasons for Decision
30k854(l) In General.
Court of Appeals has obligation to affirm the trial
court on any available basis.

[See headnote text below]
[4] Costs ®^208
102 —
1Q2IX Taxation
102k208 Duties and Proceedings of Taxing
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Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action
is a question of law, which Court of Appeals reviews
for correctness.
[5] Appeal and Error ®=*969
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k969 Conduct of Trial or Hearing in General.
[See headnote text below]
[5] Trial ®^18
388 —
388III Course and Conduct of Trial in General
388kl8 Regulation in General.
Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the
cases before them, and Court of Appeals will not
interfere with their decisions absent an abuse of
discretion.
[6] Licenses <@^39.43(1)
238 —
2381 For Occupations and Privileges
238k39.43 Contractors
238k39.43(l) In General.
Subcontractor that was not licensed to perform
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)

[8] Licenses ®^39.43(1)
238
2381 For Occupations and Privileges
238k39.43 Contractors
238k39.43(l) In General.
Common law exceptions to general statutory bar
against recovery by unlicensed contractors are
premised on the theory that rigid insistence on proper
licensure is unnecessary as long as the public is
otherwise protected from the harm the statute is
designed to prevent. U.C.A. 1953,58-55-604.
[9] Licenses ®=>39.43(1)
238
2381 For Occupations and Privileges
238k39.43 Contractors
238k39.43(l) In General.
Unlicensed contractors may recover for quantum
meruit in four instances: where the party for whom
the work is done possesses skill or expertise in the
field; where the work performed was siq>ervised by a
licensed contractor; where the reason for failing to
obtain licensure is minor and does not undermine
ability to perform work, or where party for whom
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contractor's representations that it was licensed and
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388k65 Reopening Case for Further Evidence
388k66 In General.
Granting of subcontractor's motion to reopen action
against general contractor in the interests of justice to
take additional evidence regarding subcontractor's
compliance with mechanics' lien foreclosure statute
was not abuse of discretion; documents sought to be
introduced were exhibits to subcontractor's complaint
that was served on general contractor to commence
action, and thus nothing unexpected was allowed into
evidence. U.C.A. 1953, 38--1-1 et seq.
[11] Mechanics' Liens <@=*309
257 —
257X1 Enforcement
257k309 Review.
In contesting trial court's
*518
ultimate
conclusions regarding subcontractor's compliance
with mechanic's lien statute and the value of its
plumbing work, general contractor was required to
show either that the conclusions were incorrect given
the findings or that the factual findings underlying the
trial court's determinations were clearly erroneous.
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 et seq.
[12] Appeal and Error @=>1012.1(4)
30 —30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30kl012 Against Weight of Evidence
30kl012.1 In General
30kl012.1(4) Clearly, Plainly, or Palpably
Contrary.
To challenge the trial court's factual findings,
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the
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evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.
[13] Mechanics' Liens <S=*309
257 —
257X1 Enforcement
257k309 Review.
General contractor did not adequately marshal
evidence in support of trial court's findings
concerning
subcontractor's
compliance
with
mechanics' lien statute and the value of
subcontractor's plumbing work, and therefore those
findings would not be disturbed on appeal; general
contractor's brief disregarded evidence that supported
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challenged findings while reiterating facts favorable to
its position, and evidence contained in addendum to
appellate brief was not organized to show its
relationship to particular findings but was merely a
catalogue of all testimony in the record. U.C.A.
1953, 38-1-1 et seq.
[14] Appeal and Error ®=>1178(1)
30 —
30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause
30XVII(D) Reversal
30kl 178 Ordering New Trial, and Directing
Further Proceedings in Lower Court
30kl 178(1) In General.
Remand was required to determine whether general
contractor was the prevailing party, and thus entitled
to attorney fees, in action by subcontractor to
foreclose mechanics' liens, where subcontractor was
improperly allowed to recover for heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) work for
which it lacked proper licensure, and HVAC claim
appeared to be single most important issue in case.
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 etseq., 38-1-18, 58-55-604.
[15] Mechanics' Liens <@=*310(1)
257
257X1 Enforcement
257k310 Fees and Costs
257k310(l) In General.
In awarding attorney fees to subcontractor in its
action to foreclose mechanics' liens, trial court was
required to distinguish between work that was subject
to a fee award and work that was not and to detail the
factors it considered in computing the award.
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 etseq., 38-1-18.
[16] Costs <®^198
102
102IX Taxation
102kl98 Form and Requisites of Application in
General.
Party that requests attorney fees must differentiate
between the fees and time expended for (1) successful
claims for which there may be an entidement to
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there
would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had
the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which
there is no entidement for attorney fees.
[17] Costs ®^208
102 -—
102IX Taxation
102k208 Duties and Proceedings of Taxing
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Officer.
In awarding attorney fees, trial court must make
findings which closely resemble the requesting party's
allocation of fees on each claim.
[18] Costs ® ^ 198
102 —
102IX Taxation
102kl98 Form and Requisites of Application in
General.
Party's failure to apportion requested attorney fees,
so as to differentiate between work that is subject to a
fee award and work that is not, is a sufficient basis
for the trial court to deny fee request.
[19] Mechanics' Liens ®^284
257 -—
257X1 Enforcement
257k284 Dismissal Before Hearing.
Denial of general contractor's motion to dismiss
subcontractor's action to foreclose mechanics' liens,
following subcontractor's failure to comply with
scheduling order concerning disclosure of witnesses,
was not abuse of discretion, where subcontractor's
responses to interrogatories specified the witnesses it
intended to call, thus giving general contractor the
information it needed in order to prepare adequately
for trial. U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 etseq.
[20] Pretrial Procedure @^>747.1
307A —
307AV Pretrial Conference
307Ak747 Order and Record or Report
307Ak747.1 In General.
Because the trial judge deals directly with the
parties and the discovery process, he or she has great
latitude in determining the most efficient and fair
manner to conduct the court's business; as a result,
trial courts have broad discretion in determining
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants
sanction.
[21] Pretrial Procedure ®^747.1
307A —
307AV Pretrial Conference
307Ak747 Order and Record or Report
307Ak747.1 In General.
Purpose behind a scheduling order is to allow the
parties to properly prepare for trial and to save the
parties from unnecessary expenses.
[22] Appeal and Error <@=>1050.1(3.1)
30 - -
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30XVI Review
30XVI(J) Harmless Error
30XVI(J)10 Admission of Evidence
30kl050 Prejudicial Effect in General
30kl050.1 Evidence in General
30kl050.1(3) Particular Actions or Issues,
Evidence Relating to
30kl050.1(3.1) In General.
[See headnote text below]
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30XVI Review
30XVI(J) Harmless Error
30XVI(J) 11 Exclusion of Evidence
30kl056 Prejudicial Effect
30kl056.1 In General
30kl056.1(4) Particular Actions or Issues
30kl056.1(4.1) In General.
Any error in subcontractor's action to foreclose
mechanics' liens against general contractor, in
allowing witness to testify as subcontractor's expert
regarding cost and adequacy of subcontractor's
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAQ
work and in limiting scope of testimony by general
contractor's expert, was harmless, where Court of
Appeals determined that subcontractor's unlicensed
status precluded any recovery for HVAC work, and
general contractor did not contest trial court's finding
concerning cost of repairing defective HVAC work.
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 etseq., 58-55-604.
[23] Appeal and Error <®=*1026
30 - 30XVI Review
30XVI(J) Harmless Error
30XVI(J)1 In General
30kl025 Prejudice to Rights of Party as Ground
of Review
30kl026 In General.
In order to prove entitlement to relief on appeal,
appellant must show it was prejudiced or harmed by
the trial court's action.
[24] Appeal and Error <®=*907(4)
30
30XVI Review
30XVI(G) Presumptions
30k906 Facts or Evidence Not Shown by Record
30k907 In General
30k907(4) Failure to Set Forth All the
Evidence.
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Court of Appeals would assume the accuracy of an
uncontested factual finding by trial court.
*520 Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, and Kevin P.
McBride, Park City, for Appellant
Steven B. Wall, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before WILKINS, P.J., and DAVIS and ORME,
JJ.
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K 4 In June 1995, the trial court issued a scheduling
order which required Whipple to disclose all
witnesses by August 1, 1995, and respond to all
discovery requests by August 31, 1995.
On
September 22, 1995, Aspen filed another motion to
dismiss alleging Whipple had violated the scheduling
order by failing to disclose witnesses and respond to
Aspen's discovery requests. The trial court denied
Aspen's motion, ruling that Aspen was not
sufficiently prejudiced because Whipple provided
Aspen with a complete list of witnesses it intended to
call at trial.

WILKINS, Presiding Judge:
Tl 1 Appellant Aspen Construction (Aspen) appeals
from a judgment awarding appellee A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing and Heating Whipple (Whipple)
$3,943 for heating, venting, and air conditioning
(HVAC) work it performed, and allowing Whipple to
foreclose on three separate mechanics' liens. Aspen
also appeals the trial court's decision to award
Whipple $7,500 in attorney fees. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
1 2 In 1993, Aspen, a general contractor, entered
into an agreement with Whipple, a licensed plumbing
contractor, to provide labor and materials for HVAC
and plumbing work on three separate properties.
When problems arose with the HVAC work on one of
the properties, Aspen discharged Whipple and
refused to remit any further payment until corrections
were made. Whipple responded by filing mechanics'
liens on all three properties and commencing three
separate foreclosure actions that were later
consolidated for purposes of trial.
t 3 Before trial, Aspen filed a motion to dismiss the
HVAC portion of Whipplefs mechanics' lien claim
on the basis that Whipple lacked proper HVAC
licensure as required by Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604
(1998). The trial court granted Aspen's motion,
however, it invoked common law principles of equity
*521 and determined that because Whipple had
conferred a benefit upon Aspen, Whipple should be
awarded the value of that benefit. The court further
determined that there were deficiencies in Whipple's
HVAC work and therefore, awarded Whipple the
value of this work, less the cost Aspen would incur in
correcting the deficiencies.
Copyright (c) West Group 2001

f 5 During trial, which took place in early October
1995, the court heard evidence concerning the value
of the work Whipple had performed on the various
properties. Aspen also pursued its counterclaim
seeking damages for the allegedly defective HVAC
work. The trial did not conclude as scheduled and
was continued until November.
t 6 When the trial resumed in late November, the
trial court allowed Ken Whipple to testify as an
HVAC expert witness. Mr. Whipple, although not a
licensed HVAC contractor during the earlier part of
the trial, had obtained his HVAC license before the
trial resumed.
In response to Mr. Whipple's
testimony, Aspen attempted to introduce the testimony
of its expert regarding defects in the HVAC work.
However, the trial court restricted the scope of this
testimony because Aspen failed to list its expert as a
potential expert witness.
^ 7 At the close of trial, Aspen argued that Whipple
had failed to meet the threshold requirement of
establishing valid mechanics' liens. In its minute
entry dated November 30, 1995, the trial court
requested that Aspen prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a judgment, and concluded
that, because neither party clearly prevailed, any
award of attorney fees would be improper.
% 8 Aspen's counsel prepared a monetary judgment
in favor of Whipple along with proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Whipple objected to the
proposed findings because they did not include an
order specifying foreclosure of the three liens and
prepared separate findings which included an order of
foreclosure. Aspen's counsel objected to Whipplefs
proposed findings, arguing there was insufficient
evidence to support a foreclosure order. Whipple
then filed a motion to reopen the case to take
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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additional evidence regarding its compliance with the
mechanics' lien foreclosure statute. The trial court
granted Whipple's motion "in the interests of
justice."
T[ 9 On September 19, 1996, the trial court held a
supplemental hearing and received evidence of the
mechanics' liens and also took under advisement
Whipple's request for reconsideration of an award of
attorney fees. Whipple asserted that now having
"prevailed" it was entitled to attorney fees as the
"prevailing party."
Aspen also requested attorney
fees, arguing it prevailed at the outset on the claim for
defective HVAC work. On March 31, 1997, the trial
court entered formal findings of fact and conclusions
of law and a judgment awarding Whipple $3,943 for
its HVAC work. The trial court also denied Aspen's
fee request, instead awarding Whipple $7,500 in
attorney fees. In addition, the trial court allowed
Whipple to foreclose on the three mechanics' liens
and valued a portion of Whipple's plumbing work for
sewer laterals at $3,200. This appeal followed.
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correctness." Smith v. Batchelor, 934 P.2d 643, 646
(Utah 1997). Fourth, Aspen argues the trial court
erred in denying its request for attorney fees and
failed to properly allocate Whipple's attorney fee
award according to its underlying claims. Whether
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question
of law, which we review for correctness. See
Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah
Ct.App. 1992). Finally, Aspen argues the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss
Whipple's case for noncompliance with the
scheduling order, permitting Ken Whipple to testify
as an HVAC expert, and in limiting the testimony of
Aspen's expert witness. Trial courts have broad
discretion in managing the cases before them and we
will not interfere with their decisions absent an abuse
of discretion. See Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande
W. R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct.App.1992)

ANALYSIS
1. Licensing Requirements

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2] J 10 Aspen raises several arguments on
appeal. First, Aspen contends Utah Code Ann. §
58-55-604 (1998) barred Whipple from maintaining
this action and that the trial court erred in granting
Whipple recovery on equitable grounds. This issue
turns on the trial court's interpretation of a statute,
which we review for correctness, without deference to
the trial court's conclusions. See Butterfield Lumber,
Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp., 815 P.2d 1330,
1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Second, Aspen argues the
trial court abused its discretion in granting *522
Whipplefs motion to reopen on grounds not provided
in Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
"Consideration of a motion to grant a new trial or
open a judgment for additional evidence under ... [
Rule 59] is a matter left to the discretion of the trial
judge, and that decision will be reversed only if the
judge has abused that discretion by acting
unreasonably." Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81
(Utah Ct.App. 1989) (citation omitted).
[3] [4] [5] 1 11 Third, Aspen claims there is
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's
determination that Whipple adequately complied with
section 38-1-7 of the mechanic's lien statute or its
valuation of Whipple's plumbing work for sewer
laterals. "We review the trial court's findings of fact
for clear error and its legal conclusions for
Copyright (c) West Group 2001

[6] \ 12 Aspen contends that Whipple's failure to
comply with the licensing requirements of section
58-55-604, precludes Whipple from maintaining this
action and that the trial court erred in allowing
Whipple to recover on equitable grounds. We agree.
1f 13 Section 58-55-604 of the Utah Code provides
that "[n]o contractor may ... commence or maintain
any action ... for collection of compensation for
performing any act for which a license is required ...
without alleging and proving that he [or she] was a
properly licensed contractor when the contract sued
upon was entered into, and when the alleged cause of
action arose." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604 (1998).
Our Legislature has determined that proper licensure
is of paramount importance and that if a contractor
performs work without the requisite license, it should
be denied compensation. Thus, the statute serves the
dual purpose of protecting the public from
incompetent contractors, while sanctioning contractors
who fail to obtain proper licensure.
K 14 However, this statutory bar is not without
exception. We have recognized that the statutory bar
"does not preclude the application of the previous
common law exceptions to the general rule of nonrecovery. " Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen,
801 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). Thus, a
court addressing the issue of whether an unlicensed
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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contractor may maintain an action for quantum meruit
must:
(1) determine whether the contractor is
properly licensed or whether its status as an
unlicensed contractor places it within the purview of
section 58-55-604; and (2) determine whether the
contractor is entitled to relief under common law
principles despite its non-licensure and support that
conclusion with appropriate findings of fact. In other
words, if the court concludes the claim falls within
the purview of section 58-55-604, but the common
law exceptions apply, then the statutory bar will not
preclude suit. However, if the court determines
section 58-55-604 applies but the common law
exceptions are inapplicable, then section 58-55-604
absolutely bars the action.
[7] TI 15 Here, the trial court stated "[s]ection
58-55-604 U.C.A. is controlling in this case .... [and
Whipple's] failure to comply with the statute is
sufficient grounds for the Motion to Dismiss to be
granted as a matter of law...." The trial court then
proceeded to allow Whipple to maintain its action
below and ultimately recover under "principles of
equity."
The court failed to adequately explain
which common law rules, if any, it applied in this
case, or support its *523 decision with appropriate
findings of fact.
Nevertheless, because of our
obligation to affirm the trial court on any available
basis, see White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376
(Utah 1994), we address whether any of the common
law exceptions allow Whipple to maintain its action.
[8] [9] K 16 The Utah common law exceptions are
premised on the theory that rigid insistence on proper
licensure is unnecessary as long as the public is
otherwise protected from the harm the statute is
designed to prevent. See American Rural Cellular v.
Systems Communication Corp., 890 P.2d 1035, 1040
(Utah Ct.App. 1995). Utah courts have generally
allowed unlicensed contractors to recover for quantum
meruit in four instances where, notwithstanding the
contractor's lack of proper licensure, the licensing
statute's purpose is met.
T 17 First, unlicensed contractors have been allowed
to recover when the party for whom the work is to be
done possesses skill or expertise in the field. See id.
Here, there is no evidence showing Aspen was
knowledgeable or skilled in HVAC work. We cannot
infer from Aspen's general contracting status that it
possessed special skill or expertise sufficient to
protect itself from incompetent HVAC work. See
Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d
Copyright (c) West Group 2001
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766, 768 (Utah 1985) (rejecting unlicensed
contractor's argument that contracting party's
reservation of plumbing work for itself rendered it
knowledgeable in that field).
f 18 Second, an unlicensed contractor may recover
if the work it performed was supervised by a licensed
contractor. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P. 2d at
1040. The cases in which this principle has been
applied have all involved supervision or labor by a
properly licensed third party thereby protecting the
original contracting party from the unlicensed
contractor's incompetence. See Kinkella v. Baugh,
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983) (refusing to apply
statutory bar where unlicensed contractor was
supervised by licensed contractor and therefore,
original contracting party "received whatever
protection is afforded by compliance with the
licensing statute"); Motivated Management Ini'l v.
Finney, 604 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1979) (allowing
unlicensed contractor to recover where "at least part
of the construction was performed by a licensed
contractor" because the licensed party's involvement
adequately protected original contracting party);
Fillmore Prods, v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561
P. 2d 687, 690 (Utah 1977) (providing when general
contractor hired unlicensed subcontractor to provide
plumbing work, unlicensed subcontractor could
recover because entire project was supervised by
licensed project engineer who ensured job was done
properly). In this case, Aspen did not have the added
protection of a properly licensed contractor to ensure
the HVAC work was adequately completed. Instead,
Whipple performed the work on its own without the
supervision of someone with proper licensure. Thus,
we conclude Whipplefs HVAC work was not
adequately supervised to invoke this exception to the
statutory bar.
1 19 Third, if the reason a contractor fails to obtain
proper licensure is minor and does not undermine its
ability to perform its work, the unlicensed contractor
may recover. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P. 2d
at 1040; see also Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp., 681
P.2d 1227, 1229-30 (Utah 1984) (permitting recovery
where contractor mistakenly, but in good faith,
believed he could perform work under partner's
license); Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 804-05
(Utah 1979) (allowing recovery where otherwise
properly qualified contractor mistakenly allowed
license to lapse for nonpayment of renewal fee).
Here, the record shows Whipple has provided HVAC
work for many years without proper licensure.
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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Although Mr. Whipple claims he believed in good
faith his general plumbing contractors license allowed
him to install HVAC forced air heating systems, the
fact is, it did not. Until trial in this case, Whipple
had never complied with licensing requirements
showing he possessed the technical competence or
financial qualifications for licensure.
Equally
important, the trial court heard extensive evidence
about the inadequacies of Whipple's HVAC work
and ultimately concluded the HVAC work was
deficient.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude
Whipple's failure to obtain proper HVAC licensure
•524 precludes application of this common law
exception.
K 20 Finally, courts have considered whether the
contracting party relied on the subcontractor's
representations that he was properly licensed and
whether the subcontractor has posted a performance
bond. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P. 2d at
1041. Here, Whipple actively solicited and engaged
in HVAC work for more than sixteen years. As a
result, Whipple implicitly represented to its
customers that it was properly licensed and qualified
to perform such work.
In addition, although
Whipple claims it maintained liability insurance to
protect its customers, Whipple has offered no
evidence of a performance bond. Therefore, we
conclude Whipple does not fall within this final
exception to the statutory bar.
f 21 In sum, we have determined the trial court
properly applied section 58-55-604 to this case
because Whipple performed HVAC work without
proper licensure. We also conclude, however, that
the trial court erred in allowing Whipple to recover
for HVAC work under "principles of equity" because
the common law exceptions to section 58-55-604 are
inapplicable in this case. We therefore reverse the
trial court's ruling regarding this issue, and vacate
any award to Whipple based on the HVAC work.
2. Motion to Reopen
[10] K 22 Aspen next argues the trial court abused
its discretion in granting Whipplefs motion to reopen
"in the interests of justice." We disagree.
If 23 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant a
motion to reopen for the purpose of taking additional
testimony after the case has been submitted but prior
to entry of judgment. See Lewis v. Porter, 556 P. 2d
Copyright (c) West Group 2001
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496, 497 (Utah 1976). Furthermore, the court has
directed lower courts to consider such a motion "in
light of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in
the interest of fairness and substantial justice." Id.
f 24 Here, the trial judge stated "[I am g]oing to
grant the motion to reopen and in the interests of
justice, I think there [are] some glaring
misunderstandings in the presentation of the evidence;
and the Court is going to allow the plaintiff to re-open
as requested in their motion." (Emphasis added.) In
addition, the mechanics' lien claims in this case were
actually litigated and the court granted Whipple's
motion to address the parties' basic disagreement over
the validity of the liens at issue. Testimony of the
filing, service, and content of the liens had already
been received into evidence. The documents sought
to be introduced by the motion to reopen were
exhibits to Whipple's complaint served on Aspen to
commence the actions. Nothing unexpected was
allowed into evidence as a result of the motion to
reopen being granted. The trial court's decision did
not deprive Aspen of a full and fair consideration of
the issues regarding the mechanics' liens. Therefore,
we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
3. Compliance with Mechanics' Lien Statute and
Value of Lateral Work
[11] f 25 Aspen also argues there is insufficient
evidence to support two factual determinations by the
trial court: (1) that Whipple complied with section
38-1-7 of the mechanics' lien statute; and (2) that the
value of Whipple's plumbing work for sewer laterals
was $3,200. In contesting the trial court's ultimate
conclusions regarding Whipple's compliance with the
mechanic's lien statute and the value of its plumbing
work, Aspen must show either that the conclusions
are incorrect given the findings or that the "factual
findings
underlying
...
[the trial
court's]
determination^] are clearly erroneous." Cellcom v.
Systems Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 189
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). On appeal, Aspen attacks the
findings themselves.
[12] | 26 To challenge the trial court's findings,
Aspen must "marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence[,]" thus making them clearly erroneous. Id.
(citations omitted). We will uphold the trial court's
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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findings of fact if the party *525 challenging the
findings fails to appropriately marshal all the evidence
supporting the findings. See Allred v. Brown, 893
P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah Ct.App. 1995).

because it prevailed against Whipple on the HVAC
portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien claim, it is the
prevailing party. In light of our disposition of the
preceding issues, this contention may have merit.

[13] % 27 Here, Aspen has simply failed to meet this
burden. It did not marshal all the evidence supporting
the trial court's findings or show that, viewing the
evidence in a light favorable to the court's rulings, the
findings were clearly erroneous. Aspen ignores, for
example, the fact that Whipple offered copies of the
mechanics' liens into evidence which the court
accepted into evidence as being authenticated
documents. Aspen also disregards the extensive
evidence presented at trial regarding the value of
Whipple's plumbing work. Rather, Aspen merely
restates those facts favorable to its position or in the
alternative argues there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court's findings.

f 31 The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in
any action brought to enforce any lien under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action."
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1997). In this case,
although the trial court initially granted Aspen's
motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of Whipple's
mechanics' lien claim because of improper licensure,
it went on to award Whipple the value of the work
performed on Aspen's property. Based in part on this
finding, the trial court concluded that Whipple was
the prevailing party and entitled to an award of
attorney fees. However, this conclusion may be
erroneous in light of our determination that section
58-55-604 precludes VHiipple from recovering for its
HVAC work. Based upon our review of the record,
it appears the HVAC claim was the single most
important issue in this case and Aspen, having fully
prevailed on the HVAC claim in this appeal, may
now be entitled to prevailing party status under
section 38-1-18.
If on remand the trial court
determines Aspen is the prevailing party (FN1) under
section 38-1-18, then Aspen must be given the
opportunity to present evidence regarding attorney
fees incurred in pursuing its claim. We therefore
remand this issue to the trial court for a
redetermination of the attorney fees award consistent
with this opinion and the entry of findings necessary
to support the revised award.

f 28 Although Aspen maintains it adequately
marshaled the evidence in an addendum to its brief,
the Utah Supreme Court has denounced the practice
of marshaling evidence in an appendix stating that
M
[t]his does not comply with the requirement to
marshal evidence. It is improper for counsel to
attempt to enlarge the page limit of briefing by
placing critical facts in appendices." DeBry v.
Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1360 a 3 (Utah
1994). Worse yet, the addendum does not include a
properly focused marshaling of the evidence
supporting particular findings under attack, but rather
is a comprehensive catalogue of all testimony in the
record.
Thus, we must assume the evidence
supported the findings underlying the trial court's
determination that Whipple complied with section
38-1-7 of the mechanics' lien statute and that it
adequately valued Whipple's plumbing work.
Accordingly, Aspen's argument fails.
T 29 We note however, that the trial court's
Conclusion of Law No. 5 includes Whipple's HVAC
work as part of the order of foreclosure.
As
previously discussed, Whipple is precluded by
section 58-55-604 from recovering for its HVAC
work. Thus, to the extent Conclusion of Law No. 5
is inconsistent with this opinion, it, and any part of
the judgment that follows therefrom, is vacated.
4. Attorney Fees
[14] f 30 Aspen next asserts the trial court erred in
denying its request for attorney fees arguing that

*526 [15][16][17] H 32 Aspen also asserts the trial
court erred in failing to properly allot Whipple's
attorney fees award according to its underlying
claims. We agree. The Utah Supreme Court has
required a party seeking attorney fees to allocate its
request for fees according to its underlying claim.
See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998).
The party must differentiate between the fees and
time expended for "(1) successful claims for which
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2)
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been
an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no
entitlement for attorney fees." Cottonwood Mall Co.
v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). This
requirement also obligates the trial court to make
findings which closely resemble the requesting party's
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allocation of fees on each claim. See Foote, 962 P.2d
at 55. Finally, the trial court must clearly identify
and document the factors it considered dispositive in
calculating the award. See id.
Absent such an
allocation and documentation, this court cannot
adequately review the trial court's decision. See id. at
57.
[18] If 33 Here, Whipple submitted an affidavit
requesting attorney fees. However, the affidavit did
not differentiate between the work done that was
subject to a fee award and work that was not. The
court acknowledged that it "had difficulty, based on [
Whipple's] attorney fee affidavit, in separating the
amount of time involved with the mechanics' liens as
opposed to the amount of time spent on other
matters." Although Whipple's failure to apportion
attorney fees was a sufficient basis for the trial court
to deny its fee request, see Utah Farm Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981), the court
went on to state that "in consideration of the
complexity of the case and the total amount involved,
plaintiff should be awarded ... $7,500 in attorney
fees...."
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the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the
court's business. See Utah Dep't of Transp. v.
Osguthorpe, 892 P. 2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995)! As a result,
trial courts have broad discretion in determining
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants
sanction. See id. The purpose behind a scheduling
order is to allow the parties to properly prepare for
trial and to save the parties from unnecessary
expenses. See DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1361.
1 37 Here, the trial court determined that although
Whipple failed to adequately comply with the
scheduling order, Aspen was provided with sufficient
information to prepare for trial. The court noted that
in Whipple's response to Aspen's interrogatories,
Whipple had specified the witnesses it was going to
call at trial and the substance of their testimony.
Thus, the trial court determined Aspen was not
prejudiced by Whipple's violation of the scheduling
order.
Because Aspen obtained the information
necessary to adequately prepare for trial, we conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to dismiss Whipple's case.
•527. B. Expert Testimony

K 34 Because the trial court failed to properly
categorize the fee request or detail the factors it
considered in computing the award, see Foote, 962
P.2d at 56 (concluding "[w]here the parties'
evidentiary submissions in support of a request for
attorney fees are deficient, so will be the court's
evaluation of those fees"), we reverse and remand the
issue of fees to the trial court for a redetermination of
the prevailing party, and, based on that determination,
an award of attorney fees consistent with this opinion.
5. Scheduling Order and Expert Testimony
U 35 Finally, Aspen contends the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to dismiss Whipple's case for
noncompliance with the scheduling order, permitting
Ken Whipple to testify as an HVAC expert, and in
limiting the scope of testimony provided by Aspen's
expert witness.
A. Scheduling Order
[19] [20] [21] 1 36 Aspen asserts the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing Whipple to proceed
with its case despite its failure to comply with the trial
court's scheduling order. Because the trial judge
deals directly with the parties and the discovery
process, he or she has great latitude in determining
Copyright (c) West Group 2001

[22] f 38 Aspen also asserts the trial court abused
its discretion in allowing Ken Whipple to testify as an
expert regarding the cost and adequacy of Whipple's
HVAC work and in limiting the scope of testimony
provided by Aspen's expert witness. We conclude
that any errors in this regard were harmless.
[23] [24] U 39 In order to prove its entitlement to
relief on appeal, Aspen must show it was prejudiced
or harmed by the trial court's action. See Astill v.
Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Utah App. 1998).
Because we have determined section 58-55-604
precludes Whipple from maintaining an action to
recover the cost of its HVAC work, the expert
testimony regarding the valuation of Whipple's
HVAC work is irrelevant. In other words, the cost
Whipple incurred in performing the HVAC work is
no longer an issue. Furthermore, Aspen does not
contest the court's finding concerning the cost Aspen
will incur in repairing the defective HVAC work and
therefore, we assume its accuracy. See Cellcom, 939
P.2d at 189. Thus, the trial court's rulings regarding
the admission of expert testimony could not have
harmed or prejudiced Aspen in any way and
therefore, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this
ground.
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CONCLUSION
K 40 Because Whipple failed to comply with the
licensure requirements of section 58-55-604 and none
of the common law exceptions to the statutory bar
apply, Whipple is precluded from recovering for its
HVAC work Further, we have determined the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in granting
Whipple's Rule 59 motion "in the interests of
justice " Also, because Aspen failed to marshal the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings
regarding Whipple's compliance with the mechanics'
lien statute and the value of Whipple's sewer lateral
work, we decline to disturb those findings We also
remand the issue of attorney fees to the trial court for
a redetermination of the prevailing party and a proper
allocation of attorney fees to that party
Finally,
Aspen was not prejudiced by the trial court's actions
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in failing to dismiss Whipple's case for
noncompliance with the scheduling order, permitting
Ken Whipple to testify as a HVAC expert, or in
limiting the scope of testimony provided by Aspen's
expert witness
% 41 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion
1 42 WE CONCUR JAMES Z DAVIS, Judge,
and GREGORY K ORME, Judge
(FN1) On remand, the trial court may find helpful
the guidance on this issue offered by Mountain
States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P 2d 551, 555-58
(Utah Ct App 1989)
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